4/19/2007 1:32 PM
Whit Whitmore wrote:
I hope that we do not become too commited to the phrase "Constructive Engagement." I think it is possible to construct a topic wording that is true to the spirit of CE without using the phrase. If the concerns that I am hearing about the lack of use of the word are true (and I recall this being somewhat of an issue on the sanctions topic), then I would encourage a topic that is more focused on security guarantees. It seems from my cursory reading that there is a lot of literature on security guarantees (which the topic paper invisions as a form of CE).
5/17/2007 9:40 AM
Jason Peterson wrote:
Part 1 of 2 The wording originally suggested by Mancuso and Maffie ("constructive engagement, including economic assistance and/or security guarantees,") is best and probably overcomes some of the concerns listed by Whit. The resolution clearly directs the role that the constructive engagement policy must take by including an action (either economic assistance or security guarantees) the affirmative plan must include. While there were a few teams (I think Kansas might have been one of them) that tried to get away with just lifting sanctions in 99-00 (this resolution had constructive engagement modified by the phrase "removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions") the debates and community consensus clearly moved to require the affirmative to DO MORE. As a parallel on this topic, the affirmative would be required to give economic assistance and/or security guarantees as part of a large policy of engagement. The inclusion of the phrase “constructive engagement” is important in the topic for a few reasons. First, it will allow affirmatives to faithfully advocate proposals that are rooted in the literature. Many authors don’t advocated JUST giving assistance or security guarantees, but instead include these elements as part of a larger policy of constructive engagement. It can be frustrating to find a great affirmative idea, only to discover that making a concerted effort to solve the problem (as advocated in the literature) will open the affirmative up to extra topicality questions because the resolution ONLY permits the affirmative to give assistance or guarantees. Second, and slightly different than #1, constructive engagement gives the affirmative more leeway in deciding HOW to go about implementing greater economic assistance and security assistance. In an era when people want to give the affirmative a longer leash, this might be worth consideration. Mancuso and Maffie note that “the term “constructive engagement” generally is thought to authorize an element of quid-pro-quo give-and-take in the foreign policy. Previous examples of this foreign policy have involved offering economic benefits in exchange for certain behavior from the target government. This allows affirmatives to write their plans with more nuance than merely just increasing U.S. contact or interaction. We view this as a positive characteristic. This would allow affirmative plans to more closely hew to the proposals in the literature that deal with “Grand Bargains” to Iran, or offers to Syria regarding Israel and the Golan Heights. We clearly think it desirable for the affirmative ground to include a plan that would offer Iran substantial economic incentives and security guarantees in exchange for their efforts to limit their nuclear weapons program. Permitting that form of conditionality – which is ensured by adding the word “constructive” – is essential to affirmative ground.”
5/17/2007 9:41 AM
Jason Peterson wrote:
Part 2 of 2This affirmative ground won’t really come at the expense of predictable negative ground. On first glance, there are three ways that the plan could go down, unconditional assistance or guarantee, both countries agree to take specific actions simultaneously (what we used to refer to as a “swap” with our Korea Aff in 2k) and finally a quid pro quo where the U.S. would require a country to take some action before receiving the assistance or guarantee. There are disadvantages to each of these proposals that range from harms to U.S. credibility and domestic political weakness to the serious political fallout in the Middle East countries that could occur from a quid pro quo policy. No one should be naïve enough to think that these options for implementing the plan won’t exist next year. My concern is that they will be exclusively granted to the negative. Why not allow the affirmative to topically choose one of these instead of allowing the negative to force them to defend unconditional assistance and security guarantees?
5/17/2007 9:54 AM
Joe Patrice wrote:
My one concern remains that "constructive engagement" is a foreign policy doctrine defined by the repudiation of the alternative "isolation." 99-00 used the term correctly in calling for the US to embark on a strategy different than the isolating, punitive approach taken toward Cuba, Iran, Iraq (pre-invasion), Syria and North Korea. The foreign policy literature still uses the term this way - I've not seen any usage of the term in the context of the US (I have seen one usage by a NATO author) increasing aid to the Saudis or the Afghanis or even the Lebanese government. I worry that including "CE" functionally limits the number of countries available to Syria, Iran and the PA.
5/17/2007 12:33 PM
Whit wrote:
QUID PRO QUO: In talking with Hays Watson, it is my understanding that the "quid pro quo" option/requirement would be viable under a resolution that was only security guarantees. There is definitional support for SGs must be qpq.
SOLVENCY ADVOCATES: While I can be sympathetic that authors call for a broad range of stuff, and that a narrow reading might create some PMN issues for solvency advocates, I don't think this is solved by using CE in the resolution. Most of the literature I've read calls for stuff that wouldn't be topical even if the phrase CE was included. There is often stuff calling for UN action, which the AFF can't fiat. There are also calls to change fopo towards other countries (Israel being the glaring example). ...and If you can change foreign policy towards Israel and claim that it is part of your CE to Iran, then you have undermined the spirit of the topic paper, which meant to exclude those types of actions.
Secondly, I share Joe Patrice's concern that the phrase isn't used a lot in reference to U.S. policy towards the Middle East. This would mean that putting the phrase in the topic would be detrimental to solvency advocates, especially if having a card that says "plan w/x of CE" becomes a topicality litmus test.
Thirdly, being able to do things that are external to security guarantees and economic assistance isn't that benefitial. Putting security guarantee and economic assistance in the topic will make those areas the focus of the debate. Negatives will CP out of the external actions and force the AFFs to defend the the security guarantee or economic assistance aspects. It will be strategically unwise to choose a case where the non-security guarantee or non-economic assistance portions of the CE are more important for solving than the resolutionally mandated portions.
5/20/2007 8:59 AM
Kelly Young wrote:
My only concern about leaving CE out of the resolution is that under s. guarantee and for. assistance there's no space to lift trade embargoes against Iran and Syria. I suppose if the aff increases aid in certain areas, that would in affect undo sanctions against aid in that area, but would not necessarily repeal the remaining embargo. I think trade relations should be included within the topic.
2nd, will we have a need to include "govt-2-govt" foreign assistance or do we want to include covert assistance or NGO assistance plans? to me, those type of plans run contrary to the spirit of the controversy paper (you shouldn't be able to fund resistance groups to the PA for example). Without the term CE in the rez, then we need to include something like government to government to preclude funding resistance groups and non-state actors.
5/29/2007 6:48 PMc. marr wrote:
Yet aff must consider how one party constructively engages another party which wishes not to engage. Perry's "black Ships" engaging Japan with cannon!! Definition is closely mingled with solvency and potential disad reaction.
I hope that we do not become too commited to the phrase "Constructive Engagement." I think it is possible to construct a topic wording that is true to the spirit of CE without using the phrase. If the concerns that I am hearing about the lack of use of the word are true (and I recall this being somewhat of an issue on the sanctions topic), then I would encourage a topic that is more focused on security guarantees. It seems from my cursory reading that there is a lot of literature on security guarantees (which the topic paper invisions as a form of CE).
Part 1 of 2
The wording originally suggested by Mancuso and Maffie ("constructive engagement, including economic assistance and/or security guarantees,") is best and probably overcomes some of the concerns listed by Whit. The resolution clearly directs the role that the constructive engagement policy must take by including an action (either economic assistance or security guarantees) the affirmative plan must include. While there were a few teams (I think Kansas might have been one of them) that tried to get away with just lifting sanctions in 99-00 (this resolution had constructive engagement modified by the phrase "removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions") the debates and community consensus clearly moved to require the affirmative to DO MORE. As a parallel on this topic, the affirmative would be required to give economic assistance and/or security guarantees as part of a large policy of engagement. The inclusion of the phrase “constructive engagement” is important in the topic for a few reasons. First, it will allow affirmatives to faithfully advocate proposals that are rooted in the literature. Many authors don’t advocated JUST giving assistance or security guarantees, but instead include these elements as part of a larger policy of constructive engagement. It can be frustrating to find a great affirmative idea, only to discover that making a concerted effort to solve the problem (as advocated in the literature) will open the affirmative up to extra topicality questions because the resolution ONLY permits the affirmative to give assistance or guarantees. Second, and slightly different than #1, constructive engagement gives the affirmative more leeway in deciding HOW to go about implementing greater economic assistance and security assistance. In an era when people want to give the affirmative a longer leash, this might be worth consideration. Mancuso and Maffie note that “the term “constructive engagement” generally is thought to authorize an element of quid-pro-quo give-and-take in the foreign policy. Previous examples of this foreign policy have involved offering economic benefits in exchange for certain behavior from the target government. This allows affirmatives to write their plans with more nuance than merely just increasing U.S. contact or interaction. We view this as a positive characteristic. This would allow affirmative plans to more closely hew to the proposals in the literature that deal with “Grand Bargains” to Iran, or offers to Syria regarding Israel and the Golan Heights. We clearly think it desirable for the affirmative ground to include a plan that would offer Iran substantial economic incentives and security guarantees in exchange for their efforts to limit their nuclear weapons program. Permitting that form of conditionality – which is ensured by adding the word “constructive” – is essential to affirmative ground.”
Part 2 of 2This affirmative ground won’t really come at the expense of predictable negative ground. On first glance, there are three ways that the plan could go down, unconditional assistance or guarantee, both countries agree to take specific actions simultaneously (what we used to refer to as a “swap” with our Korea Aff in 2k) and finally a quid pro quo where the U.S. would require a country to take some action before receiving the assistance or guarantee. There are disadvantages to each of these proposals that range from harms to U.S. credibility and domestic political weakness to the serious political fallout in the Middle East countries that could occur from a quid pro quo policy. No one should be naïve enough to think that these options for implementing the plan won’t exist next year. My concern is that they will be exclusively granted to the negative. Why not allow the affirmative to topically choose one of these instead of allowing the negative to force them to defend unconditional assistance and security guarantees?
My one concern remains that "constructive engagement" is a foreign policy doctrine defined by the repudiation of the alternative "isolation." 99-00 used the term correctly in calling for the US to embark on a strategy different than the isolating, punitive approach taken toward Cuba, Iran, Iraq (pre-invasion), Syria and North Korea. The foreign policy literature still uses the term this way - I've not seen any usage of the term in the context of the US (I have seen one usage by a NATO author) increasing aid to the Saudis or the Afghanis or even the Lebanese government. I worry that including "CE" functionally limits the number of countries available to Syria, Iran and the PA.
QUID PRO QUO:
In talking with Hays Watson, it is my understanding that the "quid pro quo" option/requirement would be viable under a resolution that was only security guarantees. There is definitional support for SGs must be qpq.
SOLVENCY ADVOCATES:
While I can be sympathetic that authors call for a broad range of stuff, and that a narrow reading might create some PMN issues for solvency advocates, I don't think this is solved by using CE in the resolution. Most of the literature I've read calls for stuff that wouldn't be topical even if the phrase CE was included. There is often stuff calling for UN action, which the AFF can't fiat. There are also calls to change fopo towards other countries (Israel being the glaring example). ...and If you can change foreign policy towards Israel and claim that it is part of your CE to Iran, then you have undermined the spirit of the topic paper, which meant to exclude those types of actions.
Secondly, I share Joe Patrice's concern that the phrase isn't used a lot in reference to U.S. policy towards the Middle East. This would mean that putting the phrase in the topic would be detrimental to solvency advocates, especially if having a card that says "plan w/x of CE" becomes a topicality litmus test.
Thirdly, being able to do things that are external to security guarantees and economic assistance isn't that benefitial. Putting security guarantee and economic assistance in the topic will make those areas the focus of the debate. Negatives will CP out of the external actions and force the AFFs to defend the the security guarantee or economic assistance aspects. It will be strategically unwise to choose a case where the non-security guarantee or non-economic assistance portions of the CE are more important for solving than the resolutionally mandated portions.
My only concern about leaving CE out of the resolution is that under s. guarantee and for. assistance there's no space to lift trade embargoes against Iran and Syria. I suppose if the aff increases aid in certain areas, that would in affect undo sanctions against aid in that area, but would not necessarily repeal the remaining embargo. I think trade relations should be included within the topic.
2nd, will we have a need to include "govt-2-govt" foreign assistance or do we want to include covert assistance or NGO assistance plans? to me, those type of plans run contrary to the spirit of the controversy paper (you shouldn't be able to fund resistance groups to the PA for example). Without the term CE in the rez, then we need to include something like government to government to preclude funding resistance groups and non-state actors.
Yet aff must consider how one party constructively engages another party which wishes not to engage. Perry's "black Ships" engaging Japan with cannon!! Definition is closely mingled with solvency and potential disad reaction.