Specific Countries (or regional term) Wording Thread
This thread is devoted to the specific questions posed by including certain countries of regional terms of art (i.e., Middle East) in the topic.
CEDA Topic Blog
CEDA Topic: Specific Countries (or regional term) Wording Thread
I think a general discussion of countries is a good idea, but they seem contingent on the other thread concerning "constructive engagement." In other words, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan and arguably Egypt wouldn't be listed in a CE topic because the US already engages them. If the mechanism is different, say "USFG should improve bilateral ties with..." then, of course, the list of countries could change accordingly.
I know Afghanistan is presumptively included - but it still makes little sense to me. We have a large presence in Afghanistan and coordinate heavily with their government, which makes Afghanistan different in kind from every other country on the list. All the other countries will have generic conservative shunning type ground as well as Israel/US relations - it doesn't seem like Afghanistan would -- which will make it very different from the rest of the topic. You wouldn't really be increasing CE (or whatever the term is) as changing CE.
Also, given the massive non-unique of our current engagement with Afghanistan (and the lack of good CP ground to dump Afghanistan) I fear that negs would have to have case negs very specific to the plan action. If the aff has the flexibility to do a different forms of economic assistance that could be neg hell. Heck, even on the topic paper suggestion of allow Afghanistan to grow poppies I think the neg is way behind in the literature.
I think that a small list is fine, but if Afghanistan needs to be replaced I think Saudi Arabia would be a better choice.
Just an FYI, unofficial U.S. policy right now is to let the poppies grow. Afghanistan poppy production is currently at the highest rate in decades.
I agree with Tom. From my reading it seems like the situation in Afghanistan is the very opposite of what "constructive engagement" means in the literature. I don't think we can characterize anything we do with a country that we flood with cash and functionally occupy as "constructive engagement."
But I also don't think Saudi Arabia fits. Saudi Arabia is a key ally in the region so any policy with them is not furthering "constructive engagement" either. To the extent CE has any stable meaning, that meaning seems to be opening trade, providing aid and/or guarantees to countries characterized as "non-allies," in the hopes that the new, friendly posture might turn them into allies.
To the extent that we're wedded to "constructive engagement" as a principle for orienting the topic, I think Iran, Syria and the Palestinian Authority are the only countries that fit post-9/11 (when every other country in the region stumbled all over themselves to become US allies). Countries like Lebanon and Egypt may be interesting targets of new US foreign policy, but not "constructive engagement" because we currently characterize their governments as allies.
I actually viewed Afghanistan as a welcome reprive from the "Israel DA, Politics DA with AIPAC link" of the topic.
I've becoming increasingly concerned in recent weeks NOT with the negative ground that Tom and Joe are apparently concerned with, but with how the AFF. is going to answer the overnight Israel DA when we:
-engage a country that declared the Holocaust didn't happen
-engage a country that Israel has fought a war against, OR
-engage a country that suicide bombs Tel-Aviv and Haifa frequently.
In the current debate parlance, the Negative will say...
We have an immediate risk of a collapse of US-Israeli relations leading to immediate Israeli air strikes on Iran or Syria. This causes an immediate nuclear war overnight--all the AFF. scenarios are long-term, and sustanied US engagement with Iran, Syria, or the Palestinian authority will collapse when US-Israeli relations go over the deep end. The disad is immediate, the aff. scenarios are long-term, the neg. will win 60% of their debates.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan adds another country to the mix of options. As per "constructive engagement" we flooded South Africa with cash during the Cold War, so this argument makes little sense as to how we couldn't "constructively engage" Afghanistan.
Patrice's topic gives us three countries, all of which link heavily to the Israel DA/massive politics link. Down to three countries to research--we learned with four Supreme Court cases last year that it's just too small.
I think we should pay a great deal of deference to the incredibly well-researched topic paper done over a year from Mancuso & Maffie. I feel very uncomfortable tinkering too much ESPECIALLY in the direction of making the country list smaller. We got burned on this last year when we made the case list smaller than the originally projected 5-9 cases.
I like having Afghanistan and Lebanon in the topic and would listen to arguments about Saudi Arabia. The affirmative needs more flexibility, not less. I fear that we are getting into the typical reactionary panic that the committee gets into where they put in measures at the last second to "help the negative" that hamstring the AFF. all year. Let's give the AFF. a fighting chance.
RG
I agree completely with Ryan. I'm worried this topic will be too small.
The Afghanistan debate is indeed different from the Syria/Iran/Palestine/Lebanon debate. But that doesn't mean we shouldn't include it.
We need to be more concerned with Affirmative ground than Negative ground at this point.
Our subcommittee is doing research to make sure we think there is solid Negative ground for Afghanistan.
I also think you guys are exaggerating the amount of engagement we currently have with Afghanistan. There are several cards in the topic paper about how much more is needed.
I think we should be looking for ways to broaden the currently proposed topic, not narrow it.
We are working on Saudi Arabia, and my opinion is that it's a close call right now. We looked in to Pakistan as another nation and we are not going to recommend it.
Let's learn from our mistakes of last summer, and adapt to the changing biases in college debate that are increasingly favoring the negative.
See you all in a few days.
Steve
1) If we entirely remove the concept of "constructive engagement" from the resolutions and craft a general aid and security guarantees topic, so be it. Then we can have many other countries. I am comfortable with that.
2) "exaggerating the amount of engagement we currently have with Afghanistan"
It's starting to seem to me as though the term "constructive engagement" is kind of the red herring in this topic. We obviously could construct a topic that touches on the level to which we underfund Afghanistan, but that has nothing to do with the phrase "constructive engagement." Going back to one of my favorite sources in your topic paper, the Gambill article, it's clear that the term as employed by experts focuses on CE being an opposition to shunning. It's telling that for every article I've found using the term as a call for change in relations with Iran and Syria, I've found none using the term directly in the context of Afghanistan (some tangential uses of the term regarding US engagement with the UN - a Bolton area linguistic change -notwithstanding). If we avoid using that term in the orientation of the topic then I think we're fine.
1) I'm actually not so much concerned about Aff or Neg ground as much as I feel constrained by the term "constructive engagement" as defined in the lit.
2) "we flooded South Africa with cash during the Cold War, so this argument makes little sense as to how we couldn't "constructively engage" Afghanistan."
This misses the point. The strategy of flooding South Africa with cash was "constructive engagement" as it was done as opposed to sanctioning the country. CE is a diplomatic strategy defined by its opposition, namely shunning. The policy with South Africa and Afghanistan may both involve giving cash, but whereas Reagan provided South Africa with cash as opposed to pursuing an embargo and sanctions, we currently provide Afghanistan with cash as an occupied ally government. To include Afghanistan in a "constructive engagement" topic on the grounds that we provide them aid would be on par with calling our relationship with Israel "constructive engagement," which no one is attempting to do.
I think the only way to avoid a massive negative bias will be to allow the AFF to deal in some way with Isreal. If AFFs are limited to bilateral action with the countries currently considered then of course the Israel da will be devastating for most AFFs. If the AFF can do multilateral third party guarantees then it is likely that there will be some potential for turning the da even if it is still a viable strategy.
It seems like not putting Israel in is like ignoring the 300 lb gorilla or elephant or however the saying goes in the room or china shop or whatever.
I realize that there are some fears of bidirectionality, but I have a few thoughts. To some extent this will be inevitable. First, because of potential "X country will turn down an offer of Y, and it will be used as a justification for Z" AFFs (and by Z I mostly mean strike iran) there will be a potential for bidirectionality. Second, to the extent that there aren't many countries in the region who are lovey dovey with one another, there will be some bidirectionality (a pro-Saudi case is probably an anti-Iran case and the opposite is true). So unless we want to limit the topic to all Sunni-controled governments or all Shiite controlled governments, there will be problems in this regard. Third, maybe bidirectionality would be a good thing for combating neg bias (the main reason for not allowing it has traditionally been limiting the neg research burden).
I don't know if it is possible, but a topic that only allowed the AFF to act towards Israel when it was in conjunction with another country would seem to be a good limit. You can't do a bilateral AFF to Israel, but you can do a multilateral AFF to Israel and Iran or Palestine or Syria, etc. Like I said, I can't fathom how that would be worded, but conceptually it seems like a good idea.
I agree that Israel will be THE disad, but concerns about this hurting Aff ground/flexibility are somewhat overblown.
Arguably, Israel links best to Iran. But even in that example, it depends on the plan action itself. If the plan if lift all sanctions and give security guarantees, then Israel would flip (probably quickly)...and the link turn is long term. However, if attacking Iran is imminent, then the disad impact is inevitable. Now, if the aff been easing sanctions as a pretext for negotiations (say easy travel restrictions/visas-incentives) then I would find it hard to believe Israel would do anything but call the State Dept...who would reassure them (normal means). Also, many characterizations of the Israel disad (at least threat perception based) say Israel would immediately launch if we talked to Iran--now this is silly. They didn't freak when we tenuously "engaged" President Khatami several years ago...arguably concerned, but not ready to launch.
This is different when referring to Lebannon, Syria or Palestine. While Israel is very cautious when it comes to Iran, their "trigger" is much more happy when directed at these states (especially Palestine)...but that is usually a different internal link story from Iran.
Regardless, Israel is probably going to link, just like Nationalism or HU linked to everything on China...we'll deal