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• 5/22/2007 9:58 AM James Taylor wrote:
  Much of the literature I am coming across refers to "security guarantees" as part of a "grand bargain" that includes various incentives (lifting sanctions, unfreezing assets, etc.). Under this it seems SG would work well in conjunction with another action (provide assistance, "economic incentives"). Together, these "grand bargains" are what I take much of the "constructive engagement" literature to encompass....OR, SG can be separate from other incentives (SG + lift sanctions):
  
  Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, at The Heritage Foundation, March 26, 2K7
  [Heritage Foundation Reports, BACKGROUNDER; No. 2019, HEADLINE: Advancing Freedom in Iran]
  
  No Security Guarantees. The United States should not give Iran any comprehensive security guarantee (a common element of the "grand bargain" approach). n45 As part of the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, the regime will likely demand that the United States abandon all efforts to advance democratic change in Iran. Whatever diplomatic approach is pursued in connection with Iran's nuclear program, the United States should retain the right to promote freedom and democracy peacefully within Iran.
  
  Earlier in the article, Groves makes the grand bargains argument above. He says grand bargains/framework approaches often include SG with economic incentives:
  "In addition to resolving the nuclear crisis, the framework approach aspires to address every other major dispute that currently exists between Iran and the United States, including but not limited to the Middle East peace process; Iran's support for terrorist groups; and Iran's destabilizing actions in Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader Middle East. The framework approach is laced with economic incentives and mutually beneficial assurances designed to bring a peaceful resolution to every aspect of Iran's bad behavior in the international arena...."
  
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  If we design a resolution where the Aff must A) offer security guarantees and . offer economic incentives/assistance, then negatives are guaranteed links to both, while Affs can rest on fantastic long solvency ADVOCATE cards and advantage internals (oh yeah...and the US is "key"). This also bypasses concerns about SG encompassing Economic assistance...If SG include economic assistance and all AFFs must do both of those things anyway, everyone gets the same ground they would if the terms were distinct. This would also account for the lax use of this distinction in the policy literature.
  This would not constrain Affs because A). solvency literature heavily supports, . Affs will have to defend the same "pressure good" CP and DA ground either way.
  
  1. 5/22/2007 10:01 AM James Taylor wrote:
     the B sub points came up as smiley faces...not intended
     
     also...the last line should read:
     
     This would not constrain Affs because A). solvency literature heavily supports, . Affs will have to defend AGAINST the same "pressure good" CP and DA ground either way.
     

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