Resolved: the United States Federal Government should increase its constructive engagement with the government of Iran, Israel,
Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Saudi Arabia
and/or Syria
by offering them a security guarantee(s).
5/22/2007 3:17 PM
Scott Elliott wrote:
I would like to see at least two solvency advocates cited by the committee before they list "tri-lateral" security guarantee, including Israel.
It may be there, but I have my doubts. I don't think an affirmative should have to jam together sources to make a workable and topical plan.
5/22/2007 6:17 PM
Joe Keeton wrote:
so a topical plan will have the us announce it wont attack topical country x and the aff will just sort of claim that israel will go along with this, or will we need to have evidence that claims israel will go along. i can't wait to see how ho-hum the 2ac's will be about plan not being a big deal for israel. i'll just sit back and wait for the consult israel cp stategy.
5/22/2007 7:56 PM
Kelly Yo wrote:
Joe is correct—the affirmative will need a solvency card IF they choose to include a trilateral security guarantee to Israel that Israel will go along. SHOCKENING, we did not pull this idea out of thin air. The literature strong suggests that the ONLY way forward on a Gaza or Golan Hts peace deal is if the affirmative offers a security guarantee to both Israel and Syria or the PA. ABSENT THE LANGUAGE OF TRILATERAL, THE AFFIRMATIVE WOULD LOSE EVERY DEBATE ON TOPICALITY IF THEY TRIED TO ARGUE THAT THEY SOLVED BY ACTING TOWARDS BOTH PA/SYRIA AND ISRAEL. It’s not that the affirmative could offer a “ho-hum” guarantee to Israel—if they did, they would be totally stupid. Instead, it would have to be a security guarantee that is acceptable to the three parties involved in the dispute. The key concern is that the security guarantee to Israel cannot be against....
The other primary concern for the topic committee was how to word some inclusion of Israel without allowing affirmatives that allowed offering NATO membership to Israel, offers to attack Iran in exchange for movement on the peace process etc. that would fundamentally destroy the spirit of the controversy paper by Mancuso and Maffie. I am very serious in stating that about every 30 minutes of discussion today was followed with a committee agreement that we should not violate the spirit of the original controversy paper (which strongly answers Elliot’s edebate post that we include pigs-in-a-poke rant). The best way to include a HIGHLY limited Israeli role in a Golan or Gaza affirmative was to include them into a trilateral security guarantee which ensures some sense of common directionality without allowing the affirmative to promise anything in the world to Israel.
You are correct. The Consult Israel CP is going to a highly effective strategy on this topic. It always was going to whether we worded it as trilateral or not. With the wording of trilateral along with constructive engagement, it strongly suggests a relatively singular direction to the trilateral s guarantee—it has to be friendly or in the interest of the target nation. The only alternative is that we remove this language, which destroys any chance for the affirmative to solve a Golan or Gaza aff AND lets the Consult Israel affirmative in any way. Yes, it may not appear to be the absolute best wording humanly possible, but it is superior to wording that allows a “give any thing to Israel as a security guarantee in exchange for Golan or Gaza” and a completely insolvent affirmative trying to solve for the two most important conflicts in the Middle East.
5/22/2007 8:26 PM
Kelly Young wrote:
Kelly Young responds to Scott Elliot: I would return the Pepsi challenge to Scott to find any language better to limit the topic to including Israel in a way that doesn’t allow the aff to promise ANYTHING to Israel while allowing for a solvent Gaza or Golan Hts aff. You have until about noon tomorrow to suggest something better.
IF YOU HAD READ ANY OF THE REPORTS FROM NIGHT ONE (see http://blog.cedatopic.com/2007/05/21/end-of-day-one-research-assignments.aspx) from the committee, you will see that we explored the wordings “regional security guarantee,” “regional security framework,” “mutual security guarantee” and “direct engagement” and from a day of discussion today “multilateral security guarantee.” NONE of these terms have solvency literature basis, but all of the terms outside of “tri-lateral” allows the affirmative to do ridiculous affirmatives like allow Israel into NATO, allow the EU, Russia and any member of the Quartet to be involved and whatnot without limiting the security guarantee to Israel, the US and either Syria and the PA. This would be ULTIMATELY more detrimental to the affirmative than the fact that they cannot produce a lame Lexis card that says US w/10 trilateral w/10 Syria or PA. Again, we spent almost the entirety of one day going round and round on how to word the topic to allow Gaza and Golan affirmatives without allowing a massive explosion in the topic that destroyed the intent of the controversy paper (meaning that we did not want to reward Israel for belligerent behavior in relation to Gaza and Golan). As I explain in my post to Joe Keeton, our sole intention was to allow for viable and solvent Gaza and Golan Hts affs, since the overwhelming if not every piece of evidence on these conflicts suggest offering security guarantees to both Israel and Syria/PA.
I really don’t think we need to bother to post a single card to support our position since we already posted research papers from Night One that cover these issues. However, I again extend the Pepsi Challenge to find some superior wording to find a term that allows the aff to act towards Israel without blowing open the door to allow the affirmative to offer Israel any ridiculous security guarantee OR allows any actor (e.g., Russia, EU, Egypt etc) into the process. Four to five of us spent over 4-5 hours trying to find better language and the only alternatives were not supported by any literature OR allow the affirmative to offer unlimited guarantees to Israel.
However, I will replicate work already posted to cover this. For instance, Hays Watson’s paper argues that a PA/Israel settlement cannot happen without a 3-party security guarantee:
San Diego Union-Tribune 3/7/07 (lexis)
Clinton stressed that for serious Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to resume, the Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority must cool its demands for a major rollback of Israeli territory and unequivocally recognize Israel's right to exist.
5/22/2007 8:29 PM
Kelly Young wrote:
He warned that the United States must be prepared militarily to enforce any agreement. "The United States has to be prepared to give a security guarantee like we give our NATO allies both to Israel and to the new Palestinian state because they will both be under attack," he said.
Or these cards from the same document: Ambassador Hume Horan further supports the claim that US leadership and US security guarantees to both Israel and Palestine are vital for any agreement to emerge:
Horan 02 (Hume, fmr US Ambassador, Middle East Quarterly, Fall, lexis)
Second, the United States, with its never-equaled political, economic, and military might, should peremptorily put a stop to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has already wasted too many lives, taken up too much of our attention, and consumed resources that could have helped move the area forward. It has been too much of a distraction. The expression "confidence-building measures" has a fantastical, even cynical air of unreality to it, at least as applied in the Middle East. The so-called "peace process" has proven to be little more than a diplomatic perpetual-motion machine. It provides excuses for all to keep things on hold. Between Arab anti-Semitism and Jewish fear of Arab revanchism, no agreement is likely to be reached or to hold unless we take a strong hand. To us and to many other friends of the region, the outlines of a settlement are pretty clear: they would resemble the Camp David proto-accords. There would be a Palestinian state committed to living in peace with Israel; Israel's West Bank settlements-a bone in the throat to any peace effort-would be dismantled. There would be security guarantees for both Israel and the Palestinians. As a corollary to any agreement, there should be measures in place to monitor the sort of Palestinian state that would emerge; one Taliban-dominated state has been enough. We should work hard to enlist the association and support of our Western allies in this effort. But we should not get bogged down in details. We should ignore and bypass those who would slow our peace efforts by reviving objections drawn from over fifty years of failed peacemaking. It has been my experience that when the United States makes it clear to all the world that we are utterly determined that something must be done, reality tends to rearrange itself in a complaisant pattern. Once we do, Arab and Israeli leaders could turn to their populations and say with a shrug, "What could I do against the might and desire of the United States?"
The Iraq Study Group also cites the importance of US security guarantees to both Israel and Syria in securing a peace deal over the Golan Heights:
The Guardian 12/7/06 (lexis)
The group recommends a settlement that would include not only Israel and the Palestinians but also Lebanon and Syria. Mr Baker revives a proposal he made when he was secretary of state for a deal in which Israel would return the Golan Heights, captured from Syria in 1967, in return
5/22/2007 9:44 PM
Scott Elliott wrote:
More Answer to the Pepsi challenge: If I don't answer by noon, does Jack Bauer come over to Dallas and shoot me?
My "answer" is simple: Leave Israel out. Simple and straight forward. Every affirmative will have front lines to every possible Israel disad because they know it is coming. They will develop answers to the consultation counter-plan.
That is my alternative. Why? Your "tri-lateral," with no good solvency advoates, allows affirmatives to cobble together case solvency cards out of nothing.
It appears to me that y'all are trying to fiat solvency.
Example: from your own source:
"Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority must cool its demands for a major rollback of Israeli territory and unequivocally recognize Israel's right to exist."
Does the affirmative get to fiat that Hamas will recognize Israel's right to exist as part of the Affirmative plan text?
Example:
Plan We give Palestininas a billion dollars, just give it to them. And they "promise" not to bomb Israel. In order to get the "trilateral" agreement with Israel, we give Israel a billion dollars and increase student exchange programs (student exchange programs were a big part of the Reagan Admin's "constructive engagment" program with South Africa. Plan fosters better understanding. Isreal like the plan and Palestinians love the plan. I have a solvency author who says Palestine would love to get a Billion dollars. I have a solvency author who says Isreal would love another billion. I have another that says student exchanges are cool. Is that cool? So what is the negative ground? Syria gets jealous?
5/22/2007 9:29 PM
Scott Elliott wrote:
Kelly, Coke will always be better than Pepsi.
All I asked for was a fucking solvency advocate that says if the U.S. does X, Israel will agree. Because, if not, then you got one hell of a fiat abuse hanging within the "trilateral" resolutions.
If you get to fiat Israeli cooperation, then the negative certainly gets to fiat, say, Israel cedes X territory and decides to commit national suicide--solves case and will lead to world peace according to some Pro-Palestinian writers.
There is a substanital difference between the affirmative fiating a U.S, policy toward another country--but, my reading ot trilateral seems to give the affirmative to fiat both the U.S, and Israel at the same time.
If the cards you cite are the best solvency advocates for the trilaterla resolutions, then I think there are substntial problems.
Sipping on a coke at home.
5/22/2007 10:52 PM
Kelly Young wrote:
My only hope is that Jack Bauer comes over and shows you how to read the documents and meetings we have already posted… (yes, I am now becoming a dick because I am growing tired of repeating myself)….
Your response: “Leave Israel out.” Fascinating, how would ANY affirmative dealing with the central conflicts in the Middle East—Gaza and Golan Hts—every solve? Got a single card on this? Oh wait, you haven’t posted a card as of yet. Yes, Israel relations disad is possible in either the trilat or bilat language, the net-benefit is that under our language the aff can solve for Gaza or Golan, where under your proposal, there is zero risk of solvency for a Gaza/Golan aff, which a boat load of evidence suggests are the central conflicts that inflame hostility in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, etc.
There are solvency advocates for a trilateral proposal. I’ve already posted the evidence that says that that US must offer security guarantees on Golan and Gaza to both Israel and PA/Syria. Yes, solvency debates on this topic will not be as simple as reading one card that says “Gaza/Golan w/25 Israel /w25 Trilateral w/25 Israel agrees w/25 Syria/PA agrees”. OMFG? Imagine an affirmative having to defend multiple levels of solvency, which would allow the negative multiple avenues to debate solvency? Shame on us. (By the way, this kind of debate is only MAGNIFIED worse in a world where the aff cant offer a security guarantee simultaneously to Israel…it would be absurb…you might as well scratch PA out of the resolution or grant the Neg the best links possible without any aff solvency).
“It appears to me that y'all are trying to fiat solvency.” Um, also no. The wording “offering” means that at best we offer the security guarantee to Israel and the PA/Syria. Yes, the aff will have to read a card that say that Syria/PA and Israel will accept the plan .That again IS NO DIFFERENT than if the language was just a bilateral deal to the PA/Syria. If Israel says no to a bilateral deal, then the neg is already dead on solvency and eats the Israel DA. At least in our wording, the US is at least offering a substantial carrot to Israel to move the peace plan forward. We did not include this language in hopes to screw the aff or neg or to fiat solvency. The sole aim, which I already plainly stated before, was to give the aff a fighting change to solve two of the most important ME conflicts discussed in the literature.
If you could meet my original challenge to provide evidence that a unilateral security guarantee to the PA or Syria can solve for Gaza or Golan, then you win. However, I have looked at over 25-30 articles on this subject so far that all claim that an offer must be given to both the PA/Syria and Israel to solve these conflicts.
Scott says: Example: from your own source: "Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority must cool its demands for a major rollback of Israeli territory and unequivocally recognize Israel's right to exist."
5/22/2007 10:54 PM
Kelly Young wrote:
Does the affirmative get to fiat that Hamas will recognize Israel's right to exist as part of the Affirmative plan text?
Me: Nope. The affirmative doesn’t get to fiat this. Hence the wording that says “Resolved: the United States Federal Government should increase its constructive engagement with the government of …. including offering them security guarantees and/or a substantial increase in foreign assistance.” The key word here is “offering” the security guarantee. Again, yes, the aff must prove that the other two parties—Syria/PA and Israel will agree to the plan, but this is a perfect example of that kind of evidence:
Brent Scowcroft, former national security advisor to Ford and Bush and president of the Forum for International Policy, 2000 (“A US role on the Golan Heights?,” NY Times, Jan 6, pp. LN)
The United States has an enormous stake in the peace talks between Israel and Syria, and the Clinton administration has indicated it would be willing to ease the financial burden that any deal would entail. What may be on the table at some point, however, is something more controversial: a long-term American presence on the Golan Heights. Unlike the multifaceted controversy between Israel and the Palestinians over the West Bank, the issues between Syria and Israel are overwhelmingly about security. Put simply, whichever country occupies or can quickly seize the Golan has a significant strategic advantage over the other. Given the fact that Israel and Syria have fought three wars since 1947, it is not plausible that either would be willing to trust its security to the good will of the other. Thus it is very possible that the security each side seeks could be satisfied only by an outside presence on the border. It is unlikely that Prime Minister Ehud Barak would agree to United Nations peacekeepers, given Israel's previous experience with such an international force. In 1967 the United Nations pulled its troops from the Sinai Peninsula upon the demands of President Nasser of Egypt; the Six-Day War followed. The only outside presence the two sides would be likely to agree on would be the United States (or possibly the United States as well as another power chosen by Syria).
Scott then gives this unsubstantiated plan text without evidentiary support: “Plan We give Palestininas a billion dollars, just give it to them. And they "promise" not to bomb Israel. In order to get the "trilateral" agreement with Israel, we give Israel a billion dollars and increase student exchange programs (student exchange programs were a big part of the Reagan Admin's "constructive engagment" program with South Africa. Plan fosters better understanding. Isreal like the plan and Palestinians love the plan. I have a solvency author who says Palestine would love to get a Billion dollars. I have a solvency author who says Isreal would love another billion. I have another that says student exchanges are cool. Is that cool? So what is the negative ground?
Um, again, Pepsi Challenge: the term “trilateral” inherently checks against this. Your example would be true if the resolution said: offering security guarantees to the PA and Israel. Instead, Trilateral suggests, in the literature, that it’s an agree upon condition by both sides. It’s not just a cobbling together of random cards. For instance, US or international troops on Golan, mutual guarantees that the US will protect both Israel and the PA from attack over Gaza, etc. This is all grounded in the literature. Also the term “constructive engagement” with Syria or PA would check—the plan would have to be an assurance to Syria or the PA. If it isn’t inherently so,the negative ground is for your plan is that the neg could CP out giving a billion dollars to Israel alone and argue that giving money to the PA in addition would threaten Israel. However, in comparison, the evidence is fairly good that giving a security guarantee to monitor Gaza unilateral would make no sense if the other nation didn’t agree to withdrawal troop without a conditioned security guarantee from the US.
Actually, Diet Coke is > Coke or Pepsi:
Scott asserts: “All I asked for was a fucking solvency advocate that says if the U.S. does X, Israel will agree. Because, if not, then you got one hell of a fiat abuse hanging within the "trilateral" resolutions.”
I respond: The evidence was provided earlier and there’s a host of other cards that say that if we give mutual guarantees, both nations would consider moving forward on the peace process (see my CBMs paper and Hays’ paper on the CEDA blog site). Um, yeah, the affirmative under any of these resolutions does NOT get to fiat Israeli action. Hence the term “offering them a trilateral security guarantee with Israel.” There is ZERO in that statement that allows the Aff to fiat that Israel accepts the plan. That becomes a solvency question. The San Diego Union-Tribune and Hume Horan and ISG evidence ALL suggest that unless the US offers a mutual security guarantee—a trilateral deal between the US-Israel-Syria/PA—there’s zero chance for solvency on Gaza or Golan. Your original challenge was to provide wording that would allow for any chance for solvency on Gaza or Golan. Your claim to just exclude Israel in any way denies the wealth of literature on these two highly important conflicts.
Again, the affirmative CANNOT Fiat Israel under any of the wordings we offer. The USFG ONLY gets to offer a deal to Israel and X nation. Again, it’s a solvency burden for the aff to say both nations would agree to the offer.
5/23/2007 4:39 AM
Scott Elliott wrote:
I read your response and i am left shaking my head. So now all the affirmative has to do is "offer" Israel a deal to be topical. This means Israel can reject, no solvency, but no disads. I find it disgusting. I know it doesn't matter, but I like to have concerns on the record.
Example: Golan hts.
Plan The U.S. "offers" Syria and Israel the opportunity to place troops on the border as a trilateral security gurantee.
Affirmative Non-Solvency, Solvency (hear me out): Israel will never go for it. The internl politics prevents their agreement. Which means, even though we offer, the plan never actually gets implemented. Syria won't go for it either. In other words, we accomplish nothing in a real since and the negative does not get jack shit for a link to military overstretch, increased U.S. presence in the region, or some Israeli or hard linder freak out.
Advantage 1: The U.S. improves its relations with EU countires. With growing muslim populations, EU governments want to see a chang ein U.S. Rhetoric and a more concillatory posture--even if it does not work. EU cooperation is important to solve global environmental issues. Global death impacts.
You have a situation in which the negative will be reading solvency cards in order to get a link to their disads.
5/23/2007 6:27 AM
Whit wrote:
So your idea of a *good* AFF is one where the U.S. just puts its troops in the Golan regardless of what Israel and Syria think? Yeah that's a good debate to have. I'm sure the AFF will win lots of those debates.
5/23/2007 7:27 AM
Scott Elliott wrote:
No. The good aff. would merely "offer" to do something, knowing full well it will be rejected by Israel, Syria, or both--yet claim advantages from the symbolic olive branch. E.U or Russia advantages, or Soft-line rhetoric good, even if it does not really accomplish the stated goal.
You don't get your links to your disads, but i get an EU advantage.
I think any proposal to put U.S. troops in the Mid-East right now is exceedingly stupid and is unacceptable globally. Maybe there are people wrting cards in 2007 saying putting U.S. troops on the Golan is a good idea, but I think the majority of people are writing, any U.S. military presence in the area will only further tensions and exacerbate the current Iraq-esque problems we have.
I would like to see at least two solvency advocates cited by the committee before they list "tri-lateral" security guarantee, including Israel.
It may be there, but I have my doubts. I don't think an affirmative should have to jam together sources to make a workable and topical plan.
so a topical plan will have the us announce it wont attack topical country x and the aff will just sort of claim that israel will go along with this, or will we need to have evidence that claims israel will go along. i can't wait to see how ho-hum the 2ac's will be about plan not being a big deal for israel. i'll just sit back and wait for the consult israel cp stategy.
Joe is correct—the affirmative will need a solvency card IF they choose to include a trilateral security guarantee to Israel that Israel will go along. SHOCKENING, we did not pull this idea out of thin air. The literature strong suggests that the ONLY way forward on a Gaza or Golan Hts peace deal is if the affirmative offers a security guarantee to both Israel and Syria or the PA. ABSENT THE LANGUAGE OF TRILATERAL, THE AFFIRMATIVE WOULD LOSE EVERY DEBATE ON TOPICALITY IF THEY TRIED TO ARGUE THAT THEY SOLVED BY ACTING TOWARDS BOTH PA/SYRIA AND ISRAEL. It’s not that the affirmative could offer a “ho-hum” guarantee to Israel—if they did, they would be totally stupid. Instead, it would have to be a security guarantee that is acceptable to the three parties involved in the dispute. The key concern is that the security guarantee to Israel cannot be against....
the interest of Syria or the PA.
The other primary concern for the topic committee was how to word some inclusion of Israel without allowing affirmatives that allowed offering NATO membership to Israel, offers to attack Iran in exchange for movement on the peace process etc. that would fundamentally destroy the spirit of the controversy paper by Mancuso and Maffie. I am very serious in stating that about every 30 minutes of discussion today was followed with a committee agreement that we should not violate the spirit of the original controversy paper (which strongly answers Elliot’s edebate post that we include pigs-in-a-poke rant). The best way to include a HIGHLY limited Israeli role in a Golan or Gaza affirmative was to include them into a trilateral security guarantee which ensures some sense of common directionality without allowing the affirmative to promise anything in the world to Israel.
You are correct. The Consult Israel CP is going to a highly effective strategy on this topic. It always was going to whether we worded it as trilateral or not. With the wording of trilateral along with constructive engagement, it strongly suggests a relatively singular direction to the trilateral s guarantee—it has to be friendly or in the interest of the target nation. The only alternative is that we remove this language, which destroys any chance for the affirmative to solve a Golan or Gaza aff AND lets the Consult Israel affirmative in any way. Yes, it may not appear to be the absolute best wording humanly possible, but it is superior to wording that allows a “give any thing to Israel as a security guarantee in exchange for Golan or Gaza” and a completely insolvent affirmative trying to solve for the two most important conflicts in the Middle East.
Kelly Young responds to Scott Elliot:
I would return the Pepsi challenge to Scott to find any language better to limit the topic to including Israel in a way that doesn’t allow the aff to promise ANYTHING to Israel while allowing for a solvent Gaza or Golan Hts aff. You have until about noon tomorrow to suggest something better.
IF YOU HAD READ ANY OF THE REPORTS FROM NIGHT ONE (see http://blog.cedatopic.com/2007/05/21/end-of-day-one-research-assignments.aspx) from the committee, you will see that we explored the wordings “regional security guarantee,” “regional security framework,” “mutual security guarantee” and “direct engagement” and from a day of discussion today “multilateral security guarantee.” NONE of these terms have solvency literature basis, but all of the terms outside of “tri-lateral” allows the affirmative to do ridiculous affirmatives like allow Israel into NATO, allow the EU, Russia and any member of the Quartet to be involved and whatnot without limiting the security guarantee to Israel, the US and either Syria and the PA. This would be ULTIMATELY more detrimental to the affirmative than the fact that they cannot produce a lame Lexis card that says US w/10 trilateral w/10 Syria or PA. Again, we spent almost the entirety of one day going round and round on how to word the topic to allow Gaza and Golan affirmatives without allowing a massive explosion in the topic that destroyed the intent of the controversy paper (meaning that we did not want to reward Israel for belligerent behavior in relation to Gaza and Golan). As I explain in my post to Joe Keeton, our sole intention was to allow for viable and solvent Gaza and Golan Hts affs, since the overwhelming if not every piece of evidence on these conflicts suggest offering security guarantees to both Israel and Syria/PA.
I really don’t think we need to bother to post a single card to support our position since we already posted research papers from Night One that cover these issues. However, I again extend the Pepsi Challenge to find some superior wording to find a term that allows the aff to act towards Israel without blowing open the door to allow the affirmative to offer Israel any ridiculous security guarantee OR allows any actor (e.g., Russia, EU, Egypt etc) into the process. Four to five of us spent over 4-5 hours trying to find better language and the only alternatives were not supported by any literature OR allow the affirmative to offer unlimited guarantees to Israel.
However, I will replicate work already posted to cover this. For instance, Hays Watson’s paper argues that a PA/Israel settlement cannot happen without a 3-party security guarantee:
San Diego Union-Tribune 3/7/07 (lexis)
Clinton stressed that for serious Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to resume, the Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority must cool its demands for a major rollback of Israeli territory and unequivocally recognize Israel's right to exist.
He warned that the United States must be prepared militarily to enforce any agreement.
"The United States has to be prepared to give a security guarantee like we give our NATO allies both to Israel and to the new Palestinian state because they will both be under attack," he said.
Or these cards from the same document:
Ambassador Hume Horan further supports the claim that US leadership and US security guarantees to both Israel and Palestine are vital for any agreement to emerge:
Horan 02 (Hume, fmr US Ambassador, Middle East Quarterly, Fall, lexis)
Second, the United States, with its never-equaled political, economic, and military might, should peremptorily put a stop to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has already wasted too many lives, taken up too much of our attention, and consumed resources that could have helped move the area forward. It has been too much of a distraction. The expression "confidence-building measures" has a fantastical, even cynical air of unreality to it, at least as applied in the Middle East. The so-called "peace process" has proven to be little more than a diplomatic perpetual-motion machine. It provides excuses for all to keep things on hold. Between Arab anti-Semitism and Jewish fear of Arab revanchism, no agreement is likely to be reached or to hold unless we take a strong hand.
To us and to many other friends of the region, the outlines of a settlement are pretty clear: they would resemble the Camp David proto-accords. There would be a Palestinian state committed to living in peace with Israel; Israel's West Bank settlements-a bone in the throat to any peace effort-would be dismantled. There would be security guarantees for both Israel and the Palestinians. As a corollary to any agreement, there should be measures in place to monitor the sort of Palestinian state that would emerge; one Taliban-dominated state has been enough.
We should work hard to enlist the association and support of our Western allies in this effort. But we should not get bogged down in details. We should ignore and bypass those who would slow our peace efforts by reviving objections drawn from over fifty years of failed peacemaking. It has been my experience that when the United States makes it clear to all the world that we are utterly determined that something must be done, reality tends to rearrange itself in a complaisant pattern. Once we do, Arab and Israeli leaders could turn to their populations and say with a shrug, "What could I do against the might and desire of the United States?"
The Iraq Study Group also cites the importance of US security guarantees to both Israel and Syria in securing a peace deal over the Golan Heights:
The Guardian 12/7/06 (lexis)
The group recommends a settlement that would include not only Israel and the Palestinians but also Lebanon and Syria. Mr Baker revives a proposal he made when he was secretary of state for a deal in which Israel would return the Golan Heights, captured from Syria in 1967, in return
More Answer to the Pepsi challenge: If I don't answer by noon, does Jack Bauer come over to Dallas and shoot me?
My "answer" is simple: Leave Israel out. Simple and straight forward. Every affirmative will have front lines to every possible Israel disad because they know it is coming. They will develop answers to the consultation counter-plan.
That is my alternative. Why? Your "tri-lateral," with no good solvency advoates, allows affirmatives to cobble together case solvency cards out of nothing.
It appears to me that y'all are trying to fiat solvency.
Example: from your own source:
"Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority must cool its demands for a major rollback of Israeli territory and unequivocally recognize Israel's right to exist."
Does the affirmative get to fiat that Hamas will recognize Israel's right to exist as part of the Affirmative plan text?
Example:
Plan We give Palestininas a billion dollars, just give it to them. And they "promise" not to bomb Israel. In order to get the "trilateral" agreement with Israel, we give Israel a billion dollars and increase student exchange programs (student exchange programs were a big part of the Reagan Admin's "constructive engagment" program with South Africa. Plan fosters better understanding. Isreal like the plan and Palestinians love the plan. I have a solvency author who says Palestine would love to get a Billion dollars. I have a solvency author who says Isreal would love another billion. I have another that says student exchanges are cool. Is that cool? So what is the negative ground? Syria gets jealous?
Kelly, Coke will always be better than Pepsi.
All I asked for was a fucking solvency advocate that says if the U.S. does X, Israel will agree. Because, if not, then you got one hell of a fiat abuse hanging within the "trilateral" resolutions.
If you get to fiat Israeli cooperation, then the negative certainly gets to fiat, say, Israel cedes X territory and decides to commit national suicide--solves case and will lead to world peace according to some Pro-Palestinian writers.
There is a substanital difference between the affirmative fiating a U.S, policy toward another country--but, my reading ot trilateral seems to give the affirmative to fiat both the U.S, and Israel at the same time.
If the cards you cite are the best solvency advocates for the trilaterla resolutions, then I think there are substntial problems.
Sipping on a coke at home.
My only hope is that Jack Bauer comes over and shows you how to read the documents and meetings we have already posted… (yes, I am now becoming a dick because I am growing tired of repeating myself)….
Your response: “Leave Israel out.” Fascinating, how would ANY affirmative dealing with the central conflicts in the Middle East—Gaza and Golan Hts—every solve? Got a single card on this? Oh wait, you haven’t posted a card as of yet. Yes, Israel relations disad is possible in either the trilat or bilat language, the net-benefit is that under our language the aff can solve for Gaza or Golan, where under your proposal, there is zero risk of solvency for a Gaza/Golan aff, which a boat load of evidence suggests are the central conflicts that inflame hostility in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, etc.
There are solvency advocates for a trilateral proposal. I’ve already posted the evidence that says that that US must offer security guarantees on Golan and Gaza to both Israel and PA/Syria. Yes, solvency debates on this topic will not be as simple as reading one card that says “Gaza/Golan w/25 Israel /w25 Trilateral w/25 Israel agrees w/25 Syria/PA agrees”. OMFG? Imagine an affirmative having to defend multiple levels of solvency, which would allow the negative multiple avenues to debate solvency? Shame on us. (By the way, this kind of debate is only MAGNIFIED worse in a world where the aff cant offer a security guarantee simultaneously to Israel…it would be absurb…you might as well scratch PA out of the resolution or grant the Neg the best links possible without any aff solvency).
“It appears to me that y'all are trying to fiat solvency.” Um, also no. The wording “offering” means that at best we offer the security guarantee to Israel and the PA/Syria. Yes, the aff will have to read a card that say that Syria/PA and Israel will accept the plan .That again IS NO DIFFERENT than if the language was just a bilateral deal to the PA/Syria. If Israel says no to a bilateral deal, then the neg is already dead on solvency and eats the Israel DA. At least in our wording, the US is at least offering a substantial carrot to Israel to move the peace plan forward. We did not include this language in hopes to screw the aff or neg or to fiat solvency. The sole aim, which I already plainly stated before, was to give the aff a fighting change to solve two of the most important ME conflicts discussed in the literature.
If you could meet my original challenge to provide evidence that a unilateral security guarantee to the PA or Syria can solve for Gaza or Golan, then you win. However, I have looked at over 25-30 articles on this subject so far that all claim that an offer must be given to both the PA/Syria and Israel to solve these conflicts.
Scott says: Example: from your own source: "Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority must cool its demands for a major rollback of Israeli territory and unequivocally recognize Israel's right to exist."
Does the affirmative get to fiat that Hamas will recognize Israel's right to exist as part of the Affirmative plan text?
Me: Nope. The affirmative doesn’t get to fiat this. Hence the wording that says “Resolved: the United States Federal Government should increase its constructive engagement with the government of …. including offering them security guarantees and/or a substantial increase in foreign assistance.” The key word here is “offering” the security guarantee. Again, yes, the aff must prove that the other two parties—Syria/PA and Israel will agree to the plan, but this is a perfect example of that kind of evidence:
Brent Scowcroft, former national security advisor to Ford and Bush and president of the Forum for International Policy, 2000 (“A US role on the Golan Heights?,” NY Times, Jan 6, pp. LN)
The United States has an enormous stake in the peace talks between Israel and Syria, and the Clinton administration has indicated it would be willing to ease the financial burden that any deal would entail. What may be on the table at some point, however, is something more controversial: a long-term American presence on the Golan Heights.
Unlike the multifaceted controversy between Israel and the Palestinians over the West Bank, the issues between Syria and Israel are overwhelmingly about security. Put simply, whichever country occupies or can quickly seize the Golan has a significant strategic advantage over the other. Given the fact that Israel and Syria have fought three wars since 1947, it is not plausible that either would be willing to trust its security to the good will of the other.
Thus it is very possible that the security each side seeks could be satisfied only by an outside presence on the border. It is unlikely that Prime Minister Ehud Barak would agree to United Nations peacekeepers, given Israel's previous experience with such an international force. In 1967 the United Nations pulled its troops from the Sinai Peninsula upon the demands of President Nasser of Egypt; the Six-Day War followed.
The only outside presence the two sides would be likely to agree on would be the United States (or possibly the United States as well as another power chosen by Syria).
Scott then gives this unsubstantiated plan text without evidentiary support: “Plan We give Palestininas a billion dollars, just give it to them. And they "promise" not to bomb Israel. In order to get the "trilateral" agreement with Israel, we give Israel a billion dollars and increase student exchange programs (student exchange programs were a big part of the Reagan Admin's "constructive engagment" program with South Africa. Plan fosters better understanding. Isreal like the plan and Palestinians love the plan. I have a solvency author who says Palestine would love to get a Billion dollars. I have a solvency author who says Isreal would love another billion. I have another that says student exchanges are cool. Is that cool? So what is the negative ground?
Syria gets jealous?”
Um, again, Pepsi Challenge: the term “trilateral” inherently checks against this. Your example would be true if the resolution said: offering security guarantees to the PA and Israel. Instead, Trilateral suggests, in the literature, that it’s an agree upon condition by both sides. It’s not just a cobbling together of random cards. For instance, US or international troops on Golan, mutual guarantees that the US will protect both Israel and the PA from attack over Gaza, etc. This is all grounded in the literature. Also the term “constructive engagement” with Syria or PA would check—the plan would have to be an assurance to Syria or the PA. If it isn’t inherently so,the negative ground is for your plan is that the neg could CP out giving a billion dollars to Israel alone and argue that giving money to the PA in addition would threaten Israel. However, in comparison, the evidence is fairly good that giving a security guarantee to monitor Gaza unilateral would make no sense if the other nation didn’t agree to withdrawal troop without a conditioned security guarantee from the US.
Actually, Diet Coke is > Coke or Pepsi:
Scott asserts: “All I asked for was a fucking solvency advocate that says if the U.S. does X, Israel will agree. Because, if not, then you got one hell of a fiat abuse hanging within the "trilateral" resolutions.”
I respond: The evidence was provided earlier and there’s a host of other cards that say that if we give mutual guarantees, both nations would consider moving forward on the peace process (see my CBMs paper and Hays’ paper on the CEDA blog site). Um, yeah, the affirmative under any of these resolutions does NOT get to fiat Israeli action. Hence the term “offering them a trilateral security guarantee with Israel.” There is ZERO in that statement that allows the Aff to fiat that Israel accepts the plan. That becomes a solvency question. The San Diego Union-Tribune and Hume Horan and ISG evidence ALL suggest that unless the US offers a mutual security guarantee—a trilateral deal between the US-Israel-Syria/PA—there’s zero chance for solvency on Gaza or Golan. Your original challenge was to provide wording that would allow for any chance for solvency on Gaza or Golan. Your claim to just exclude Israel in any way denies the wealth of literature on these two highly important conflicts.
Again, the affirmative CANNOT Fiat Israel under any of the wordings we offer. The USFG ONLY gets to offer a deal to Israel and X nation. Again, it’s a solvency burden for the aff to say both nations would agree to the offer.
I read your response and i am left shaking my head. So now all the affirmative has to do is "offer" Israel a deal to be topical. This means Israel can reject, no solvency, but no disads. I find it disgusting.
I know it doesn't matter, but I like to have concerns on the record.
Example: Golan hts.
Plan The U.S. "offers" Syria and Israel the opportunity to place troops on the border as a trilateral security gurantee.
Affirmative Non-Solvency, Solvency (hear me out): Israel will never go for it. The internl politics prevents their agreement. Which means, even though we offer, the plan never actually gets implemented. Syria won't go for it either. In other words, we accomplish nothing in a real since and the negative does not get jack shit for a link to military overstretch, increased U.S. presence in the region, or some Israeli or hard linder freak out.
Advantage 1: The U.S. improves its relations with EU countires. With growing muslim populations, EU governments want to see a chang ein U.S. Rhetoric and a more concillatory posture--even if it does not work. EU cooperation is important to solve global environmental issues. Global death impacts.
You have a situation in which the negative will be reading solvency cards in order to get a link to their disads.
So your idea of a *good* AFF is one where the U.S. just puts its troops in the Golan regardless of what Israel and Syria think? Yeah that's a good debate to have. I'm sure the AFF will win lots of those debates.
No. The good aff. would merely "offer" to do something, knowing full well it will be rejected by Israel, Syria, or both--yet claim advantages from the symbolic olive branch. E.U or Russia advantages, or Soft-line rhetoric good, even if it does not really accomplish the stated goal.
You don't get your links to your disads, but i get an EU advantage.
I think any proposal to put U.S. troops in the Mid-East right now is exceedingly stupid and is unacceptable globally. Maybe there are people wrting cards in 2007 saying putting U.S. troops on the Golan is a good idea, but I think the majority of people are writing, any U.S. military presence in the area will only further tensions and exacerbate the current Iraq-esque problems we have.