Working Resolution #5
Resolved: the United States Federal Government should
increase its constructive engagement with the government of
CEDA Topic Blog
CEDA Topic: Working Resolution #5
Resolved: the United States Federal Government should
increase its constructive engagement with the government of
You all should really think twice about Afghanistan. Seriously. Let's look at the "security guarantee" resoltuuions that include it.
Either 1) Afghanistan is superflous because what more security guarantte czan you have than NATO and U.S. Troops ALREADY FREAKING in the country, keeping the Taliban at bay!
or 2) if there is some unique plan advantage--let's see, we provide a nuclear umbrella to Afghanistan in case North Korea decides to first strike a poppy field.--There negative has NO uniqueness for there disads. I mean I have harped on this since, literally, the first ten minutes the topic paper came out. But I have yet to see a rational(e) response as to how Afghanistan would function as a balanced case area--either it tilts too much negative--no Aff cases, or too much affirmative--no negative disad ground.
Scott
First of all, how is it freakin’ possible to argue that a given topic country either tilts too much towards the neg or affirmative? Seriously, you disprove both arguments by making this claim. As for the potential aff cases, those are listed below (which is simply a repeat form the original controversy paper and Hays Waston’s work). The Uniqueness that you PAINFULLY ignore is that the US has massively retrenched on their security commitments to Afghanistan since 9-11. This was an argument in the original controversy paper. Yes, the painfully obvious is true: US and NATO troops are in Afghanistan. But that is ENTIRELY different than a security guarantee to this nation, which the evidence in the original controversy paper and Hays Watson’s papers make clear.
Again, this is an obvious case that you have paid ZERO attention to any of the work of the topic committee. Seriously, we do don’t work in a bubble ignorant that Afghanistan has “NATO and U.S. Troops ALREADY FREAKING in the country, keeping the Taliban at bay!” My first response Scott is that you should apply for a job with the Bush Administration if you believe that we have held a strong committee to our security guarantees to Afghanistan and that our troops are keeping the Taliban at bay. Even a quick glance at a journalistic rag like the US TODAY suggests that this isn’t the case. Perhaps far more importantly, the security guarantees paper by Hays Watson—released a week before we meet this week—suggests the following:
Literature regarding security guarantees to the Middle East are not merely limited to the
countries listed above; rather, many other countries such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Kurdistan (not a country, of course), and others are also discussed in the literature base. Vance Serchuk of the American Enterprise Institute argues strongly for a US security guarantee for Afghanistan:
Serchuk 1/16/06 (Vance, research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Weekly Standard, lexis)
The Bush administration furiously denies that NATO expansion should be seen as an American exit strategy, but this denial would seem more credible if the Pentagon didn't then explicitly link its 2,500-man drawdown in Afghanistan to the alliance's growing presence there. The danger here goes well beyond the narrow question of manpower. To a much greater degree than the Bush administration seems to appreciate, success in Afghanistan depends on a good-as-gold, long-term security guarantee from the United States. The survival of the Taliban, in turn, is contingent on a belief that the insurgents will outlast the Americans; that, sooner or later, Washington will tire of a grinding guerrilla war and go home.
The United States needs to leave no doubt that its military will continue fighting in Afghanistan as long as the democratically elected government in Kabul needs help. For the same reason, irrespective of whether a diminution in the number of American soldiers is operationally doable, the Pentagon would
would have been wise to skip the press release and implement its drawdown quietly. Simply put, there was no strategic advantage to be gained in announcing to the world that there will be fewer U.S. forces in Afghanistan this year. Afghanistan's leaders certainly understand this. Senior officials in Kabul, tribal elders in the south, and newly elected legislators have all expressed concern about the troop reductions. "I would not like them to leave," Mullah Naquibullah, a tribal leader in Kandahar, told the New York Times last month.
The White House should pay heed. In the months ahead, the Bush administration needs to make clear that it still takes its bilateral security relationship with Afghanistan seriously. It can do this by returning to, and reinvigorating, the U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership that Presidents Bush and Karzai signed eight months ago, as well as holding off on any talk about NATO expansion into eastern Afghanistan--at least until the alliance has proven itself in the south. President Bush should also take advantage of his upcoming trip to South Asia to visit Kabul and reaffirm America's long-term commitment there. Above all, however, the Bush administration needs to stop thinking about Afghanistan as a burden to be shrugged off. Washington will be on the right track when it starts doing a little more listening to its friends in Kabul--and a little less worrying about whether the Netherlands is coming along for the ride.
Or as the long submitted Mancuso-Maffie paper suggests:
Even in the region’s presumed “success story”, Afghanistan - another site
of an American armed overthrow of a government - the Taliban is resurgent.
The United States has failed to provide sufficient wealth and security to prevent
a return of the governing entities we waged war to eliminate. Seth Jones, an
Analyst at the RAND Corporation reported on January 31st of 2007:
“The rising violence and the near certainty of a Taliban spring
offensive have triggered calls for an increase in U.S. military forces
in Afghanistan. But a military strategy is not likely to succeed.
Counterinsurgencies are almost always won by establishing a viable
and legitimate government at the local level that can win popular
support. In Afghanistan, all politics is local. The country's history is
littered with empires that failed to understand this reality, from
Alexander the Great more than 2,000 ago to the British and Soviet
empires more recently. The Taliban and its allies certainly
understand the importance of local politics. They have successfully
re-emerged by co-opting or threatening local villagers, and
promising better governance and security than the current Afghan
government.”8
For as they also suggest:
For instance the United States could increase its presence in Southern
Afghanistan to shut down the Afghan poppy production.
“While the United States has gone from a “no participation” policy
to a supporting role, critics suggest that a more active role is now
a more active role is now
essential. Some suggest that U.S. strategy in this regard is
contradictory — senior U.S. military leadership describes the
Afghan drug trade as the most significant security problem facing
Afghanistan yet it appears that some believe that the U.S. is ceding
its responsibilities in counter-narcotics operations at a time that such
efforts should be intensified.”48
OR,
One hurdle the affirmative will have to overcome is the role Pakistan plays
in the Afghanistan crisis. Pakistan permits easy access for insurgents to
complicate the stabilization process within Afghanistan. The United States, via
military commitments or security guarantees, could target these insurgents and
attempt to stem the flow of insurgents in the country. Barnett Rubin explains in a
recent Foreign Affairs article:
“In the immediate aftermath of the Taliban's overthrow, the
presence of coalition troops served as a deterrent against both overt
external subversion and open warfare among the various forces that
had been rearmed by Washington. This deterrent created an
opportunity to build a functioning state; that state, however, now at
the center, rather than the margins, of global and regional conflict,
would have had to connect rather man separate its neighboring
regions, a much more demanding goal. Accomplishing that goal
would have required forming a government with sufficient
resources and legitimacy to secure and develop its own territory and
with a geopolitical identity unthreatening to its neighbors--
especially Pakistan, whose deep penetration of Afghan society and
politics enables it to play the role of spoiler whenever it chooses.
Such a project would have meant additional troop deployments by
the United States and its partners, especially in the border region,
and rapid investment in reconstruction. It also would have required
political reform and economic development in the tribal areas of
Pakistan.”50
OR EVEN BETTER FROM THE CONTROVERSY PAPER,
Another security-based approach that would target the threat of terrorism would
be to send troops to secure the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, known
as the “tribal belt.”
“Contrary to the claims of the Bush administration, whose attention
after the September 11 attacks quickly wandered off to Iraq and
grand visions of transforming the Middle East, the main center of
terrorism "of global reach" is in Pakistan. Al Qaeda has succeeded in
reestablishing its base by skillfully exploiting the weakness of the
state in the Pashtun tribal belt, along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier.
In the words of one Western military commander in Afghanistan,
"Until we transform the tribal belt, the U.S. is at risk."53
Here is an example of how the term “security guarantee” is deployed in the
context of providing troops to Afghanistan.
“The slow pace has not been lost on the Pentagon, where officials
are well aware that it will be harder for American forces to leave the
country unless the economy develops, Mr.
Karzai's authority is
reinforced and warlords are reined in. As these efforts have lagged,
Mr. Rumsfeld has sought to rebut criticism that the Pentagon has not
been doing enough. Earlier this month, he asserted that he had no
objection to enlarging the peacekeeping force if other nations were
willing to contribute the troops. But he did not offer to provide the
logistical support and security guarantees that foreign nations say
would be needed to encourage them to contribute more
peacekeepers or to take an active role in organizing an expansion of
the force.”54
Here is another example of both of the terms “economic assistance” and
“security guarantees” used in the context of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.
“President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan announced Wednesday
that he would send a formal request to President George W. Bush
seeking a long-term, strategic relationship between the two nations,
one that could include economic assistance as well as security
guarantees and military cooperation.”55
I’ll just end this with this final observation: it is VERY easy to criticize the topic committee when there has obviously been ZERO reading of any of the materials that that committee has posted via word or pdf documents or webcast. Until you have looked at any of these materials, don’t post absurd claims about the obvious mistakes that the committee has made without first understanding what we have talked about for over a month now.
AND, we have even considered this issue of uniqueness a great deal today and have assigned a group of ppl to research this element to ensure that the negative and affirmative have adequate ground. Again, we aren't ingorant of the NATO/US presence in Afghanistan. But there is a signficant diffence between occupying a nation and having a security guarantee with that nation given the inattention the Bush Administration has given this nation.
One last problem with bilateral and trilateral. This makes it very easy for the nagative to run a four-party talks counter-plan (see e.g the seven party talks going on in North korea) As drafted, and affirmative cannot include four or more countries. LOL
Example:
Kelly's plan would be for Syria, the U.S. and Israel enter into a a trilateral arrangement.
Negative Disadvantage: The PLA and Iran gets pissed, nukes o' plenty. etc.
Counter-plan: The U.S. does plan and consults with the PLA and Iran. mmm! That's a nice little net benefits debate. Affirmative gets to explain why a purely bilateral or trilateral relationship is superior to regional cooperation on security issues.
Tasty. Just like a Coke float.
I guess we wil just have to see negatives getting crushed on the uniqueness debates,a bout two weeks into the semester, to understand what I am saying.
Your example; Put more troops on the border, ignores that we already have special forces on the border. And, we have them in Pakistan too. We just don't talk about it too much. So, an affirmative increases troops into an area that troops already exist. They get the advantage of increasing the chance of killing Taliban Bob, but negative gets dick shit nothing from a real change in policy.
Iran--that would be a different story. Giving a security guarantee to them would be a substantial, if not radical shift in U.S. foreign policy.
Every card you fucking cite Kelly proves MY point--namely that the U.S. already has a policy of engagement with Afghanistan--it is just not implementing it to a satisfactory level, or has not made the committments it HAS ALREADY promised the Karzhi government.
I mean, you can write what ya want, but I assure you there will be a massive undeview at the bottom of each Afghanistan case that is read that will say:
By the way numbbutz, all your disads are non-unique because the U.S. has already made promises to the Karzhi government, has already committed troops, has secret covert ops all over the place, and a couple quid pro quo with the poppy farmers.
You seem to get really angery, and want to escalate. I read articles on the subject oo, asshole.
Not sure I ever called you an asshole, numbnutz or anything similar. You are the one that wants to be the jerk here Scott, which is odd given that i have given you nothing but respect over the years, even in more severe disagreements. Ball is in your court as to how you want to interpret my intentions. I think your response only undercuts the creditiblity of your claims. That will be the LAST thing I comment on the tone of your response.
Call me dick if you will, but you're flat wrong and ignorant for accusing the committee of not understanding our current troop and military commitments to Afghanistan. We have releases at least 2 documents on this question and it is just beyond me why you can make asinine claims about our competence and then follow up by calling me a dick when I say we've considered these things, if you bothered to check.
I also didn't doubt that you could read literature, but there is sufficient evidence that their is uniqueness and solvent affirmatives on the topic. Your blanket ASSERTION that their is no uniqueness is just plain false. Yes, we have place some troops on the border on both sides for example. But there is no serious commitment to those border patrols or security, which means there's zero impact on narcotics trade or terrorism incursions. Why the level of narcotic trade or terrorist incursions could not provide uniqueness is beyond me. I just think it's stupid to assert that a deployment of troops in whatever area is equivalent to a substantial security guarantee. What did you not read in the Serchuk evidence that discusses that we already have troops within Afghanistan, yet this doesn't constitute a long-term security commitment--much less a short-term commitment--to this country? I read these articles too. The literature suggests that the SQ is collapsing in our security guarantees towards Afghanistan despite modest at best deployment of troops to Afghanistan, why isn't that sufficient uniqueness? Are you serious in believing that Pakistan for example believes that we are strongly supporting Afghanistan given our indifference towards that nation since the invasion of Iraq? Where are you cards to prove that our current levels of commitment are detrimental to a Pakistan DA, Internal Afghanistan Politics DA, etc? I have yet to see one in face of the evidence I provide.
Scott says:
Counter-plan: The U.S. does plan and consults with the PLA and Iran. mmm! That's a nice little net benefits debate. Affirmative gets to explain why a purely bilateral or trilateral relationship is superior to regional cooperation on security issues.
Fascinating, again the Pepsi challenge: provide a card for the CP. Or better, explain why that CP isn't available in a world where we don't include language where we say "trilateral security guarantees?" What exactly is the DA to the US promising to provide troops on the boarder of Golan? or for the US promising to give early warning to Israel in exchange for loss of strategic depth on Golan or Gaza? Yes, there is that ancient DA that Zionists will freak out, but that link is only magnified worse if we unilaterally give security guarantees to Syria or the PA without also offering a trilateral guarantee to Israel. That was the concern of the topic committee.
The Disadvantage to alternate wording is that a regional guarantee, for example, would allow the aff to extend guarantees to Egypt, Israel, PA, Syria, Iran and any other actor simultaneously which would gut ALL negative ground. Yes, the negative will always get consultation ground. That is true whether the aff gets to do bilateral or trilateral deals. At least in the wordings offered so far, the aff gets to at least claim a solvent aff that might cut against the Israel DA to some extent rather than an aff that cannot solve for Gaza or Golan and still risk the Consult CP and Israel or Iran DA. Our wording is net-beneficial.
More pee-pee on the trilateralism parade. Sorry, but I am a strong believer in outside criticism to prevent, or attempt to prevent groupthink outcomes.
First, Kelly, et al. I went back and looked at the steller research on the Golan, the one cited by kelly is a Brent Scowcroft articles from the year 2000. You might as well be reading cards from 1948. The whole give Syria and Israel security guarantees idea was written prior to September 11 and prior tot he invasion of Iraq. I have not seen much in the way of 2006 or 2007 evidence that says anybody is even considering. I did find the Iraq study commission report, offer that as a sugestion. But Syria would have to agree to, literally at least ten pre-conditions, that there is nobody on god's green earth is writing that Syria is willing to do.
next pisser:
Turkey's Place in the Peace Process
by Paul Michael Wihbey, IASPS Strategic Fellow
The contentious issue of Israel's proposed withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines is not only a struggle between Israel and Syria over control of Golan water supplies, but also a risky tactical move to engage the Turks in the current round of negotiations by having Ankara compensate Syria with additional volume from Turkish rivers, either by diplomatic arrangement or purchase.
However, recent statements by high ranking Turkish officials have made it clear that Turkey "would not accept any peace deal between Israel and Syria reached over Turkish waters" (Turkish Daily News Feb.5/00). Turkish President Demirel reinforced this position when he said that the idea of selling water (to Syria) from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers was premature. He indicated that these water flows might be required for domestic consumption and as a part of a strategy to deal with Syria and terrorism (TDN, Feb. 21/00).
In a Jan 6, 2000, interview with the Turkish Daily News, IASPS Strategic Fellow PM WIHBEY outlined the regional implications of a water-driven Israel/Syrian Golan agreement and its impact on Turkish national security considerations. The article is reproduced below in its entirety.
Enough said--Your poorly worded resolution(s) forces the Affirmative to be either bi-lateral or tri-lateral. My c-plan is multi-lateral to include/consult with Turkey. The Net benefit is obvious as cited above. Your attempt to craft a solution to prevent the "consult Israel" c-plan or the Israel nuke war disad du jour, merely shifts the debate to other egional actors. Which, by the way, the experts of the Iraq study group agree on--only a regional, multilateral proposal will solve these problems--which your poorly written resolution specifically EXCLUDES.
To meet your Jack Bauer deadline: here is an resolution from totally left field:
Resolved the U.S.F.G. should implement one or more of the proposals of the the Iraq Study Group.
It is sweet, straight forward, downright purty, and provides everyone with clear ground for debate.